Classical References in Contemporary Culture. Anchoring Cultural Criticism in Roland Barthes's Mythologies by De Pourcq, M.J.G.M.
PDF hosted at the Radboud Repository of the Radboud University
Nijmegen
 
 
 
 
The following full text is a publisher's version.
 
 
For additional information about this publication click this link.
http://hdl.handle.net/2066/157782
 
 
 
Please be advised that this information was generated on 2017-12-05 and may be subject to
change.
 
Proceedings of Anchoring Innovation in Antiquity, 17-20 December 2015 
 
1 
 
 
Classical References in Contemporary Culture 
Anchoring Cultural Criticism in Roland Barthes’s Mythologies 
 
By Maarten De Pourcq 
 
Key-words:  Anchoring Innovation, classical reception studies, cultural studies,  
Roland Barthes, myth 
  
 
1. Introduction 
 
In this paper I will look at referencing classical antiquity in the early days of cultural 
studies. Today, we know cultural studies as an established critical practice within the 
humanities which draws our attention to the production and reception of (mostly 
contemporary) culture in its broadest sense – culture as “a whole way of life”, as one 
of the founding fathers of cultural studies, Raymond Williams, put it in his seminal 
essay “Culture is Ordinary” from 19581. Williams challenges in this essay any sort of 
reductive and universalizing concept of culture by highlighting the social 
organisation of culture and stressing its plural and often conflicting nature. He also 
makes an appeal to take stock of the contemporary in cultural criticism rather than 
ceaselessly rehearsing established knowledge and reverting to classical traditions. 
 
This typically postwar shift in cultural criticism is not only to be found in the United 
Kingdom, where cultural studies were first institutionalised, but also in France, more 
particularly in the case which I wish to discuss here: Roland Barthes’s Mythologies. 
This 1957 pulblication appeared one year before Williams’s essay and collects a series 
of previously published columns2. Their title, “Petite mythologie du mois” [“The little 
                                                          
1 See Raymond Williams, “Culture is Ordinary”, in Ben Highmore, ed., The Everyday Life Reader, 
London, Routledge, [1958] 2002, p. 92-100:  “[A] culture is a whole way of life, and the arts are part of 
a social organization which economic change clearly radically affects” (p. 95).  
2 The majority of these columns were published in Les Lettres nouvelles as “Petite mythologie du mois”, 
starting in 1955. Two mythologies were published in Esprit and France-Observateur. 
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monthly mythology”], hints at their cutting-edge take on things: each month the 
author touched on one topic that had attracted his attention because of its mythical 
quality and its random presence in everyday life, such as the stereotypes of the 
advertisement industry or the collective celebration of the Tour de France. Barthes 
collects and demystifies these topics from the perspective that they all partake in an 
ideology that naturalises historically-grown phenomena like the nation, colonialism 
or the bourgeois family. Barthes drew much of his inspiration from Lucien Lefebvre’s 
Critique of Everyday Life from 19473. However, it was Barthes’s study which became a 
reference work in most cultural studies readers, as it offers stimulating pieces on 
everyday culture and introduces a new theory of contemporary myth in the 
concluding essay. This theorization of present-day culture is still at the heart of 
cultural studies today4. Interestingly, Barthes’s analysis of contemporary culture 
frequently references the classical tradition. This is already clear from his use of the 
terms ‘myth’ and ‘mythology’, although they will not be at the heart of my argument 
here. Throughout the Mythologies there are over thirty references to Antiquity, one 
more extensive than the other. They bring me to the central question of my paper, 
which is the following: why does Barthes’s Mythologies appear to be in need of 
classical antiquity while discussing modern life? If Barthes criticizes his 
contemporaries for uncritically pursuing received ideas, what then is the critical 
function of a received classical tradition? Barthes does not comment on his use of the 
classical past, neither here nor elsewhere in his oeuvre, so in what follows I will make 
my own attempt to distinguish between several performative and discursive 
functions of his gesture to compare the present with the classical past. In so doing, I 
will make use of the concept of ‘anchoring’, which has been put on the research 
agenda by OIKOS, the National Research School of Classical Studies in the 
Netherlands, in order to gain more insight into processes of innovation. For what 
Barthes is doing in Mythologies, is exploring and formulating a new critical approach 
by means of a familiar – or at least familiarly sounding – terminological and cultural 
framework. 
 
2. The Classical Reference: Contexts and Functions 
                                                          
3 Michael Kelly, “Demystification: A Dialogue between Barthes and Lefebvre”, in Yale French Studies, 
vol. 98, 2000, p. 79-97. 
4 See Lawrence Grossberg, Cultural Studies in the Future Tense, Durham/London, Duke University 
Press, 2010, p. 1: “Cultural studies matters not because it is the only intellectual practice that can tell us 
something about what’s going on in the worlds in which we live, but because it is a different way of 
doing intellectual work, and as a result, it can say and do certain things, it can produce certain kinds 
of knowledge and understanding, which may not be so readily available through other practices. […] 
By looking at how the contemporary world has been made to be what it is, it attempts to make visible 
ways in which it can become something else.” – See also Martin McQuillan, Roland Barthes (Or the 
Profession of Cultural Studies), Basingstoke /New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2011. 
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At first sight, the classical reference looks like an old-fashioned rhetorical device. If 
we stick to the French literary tradition, it may remind us of the genre of the essay à 
la Montaigne or Rousseau where such classical topoi abound as well. The first 
performative effect of the classical reference would then be that it distinguishes 
mythology from the everyday journalism on which Barthes has based his columns, 
which comprises articles from popular periodicals like Paris-Match and L’Express. The 
objective of these magazines is to treat their subject directly, so any classical reference 
would seem a redundant digression or even a stylistic lapse, dressing the discourse 
with the prestige of an archive which not every reader may have been familiar or 
comfortable with. It should be noted that Barthes’s mythologies were originally 
written for Les Lettres nouvelles which published almost exclusively avant-garde 
literature5. Their initial audience was the leftist postwar intellectual who might have 
frowned upon the classical reference in the context of a materialist analysis of the 
present, but for whom the undertone was not as reactionary as we may think today. 
Certainly, familiarity with the classical reference implies access to classical education, 
which was not granted to everyone. In Barthes’s case, this familiarity was even 
intimate, since he had been reading Classical Philology at the Sorbonne where he had 
also founded the famous Groupe de théâtre antique6. This successful theatre group, 
comprised of students and professionals, is important for my argument, as its aim 
was to stage classical plays for modern audiences who were not necessarily familiar 
with the classical repertoire. Thus, Barthes knew the challenge of negotiating 
between the ancient and the modern. And while working on his mythological project 
in the 1950s, Barthes kept reflecting on this challenge in his theatre reviews. He wrote 
for periodicals like Théatre populaire7, where Jacques Copeau’s model of popular 
theatre from before the war was reassessed in order to establish a new popular 
theater that would not only reach an elitist audience. For Barthes and some of his co-
editors at Théâtre populaire, classical Greek tragedy was seen as a major benchmark in 
this process, as Greek tragedy was meant to be performed for the entire community 
(albeit male and free), not just for the elite.  
 
This contemporary debate in a different field makes it likely that the classical 
references in Mythologies are not merely decorative. As said before, the objective of 
the mythologies is to unearth the ideological organization of everyday contemporary 
culture. In order to do so, Barthes uses and refines various modern critical 
approaches, such as critique thématique, historical materialism, psychoanalysis and 
                                                          
5 Les Lettres nouvelles was a monthly arts and culture journal, founded in 1953 by Maurice Nadeau, 
which ran until 1959. 
6 The Groupe de théâtre antique was founded in 1935 at the Sorbonne by students of Classics, among 
whom Roland Barthes, to perform ancient plays. 
7 Théâtre populaire was a review for theatre criticism, which appeared between 1953 and 1964. 
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semiotics. These bodies of knowledge are all brought forward in the theoretical essay 
at the end of the book which was written after the publication of the columns in 
which these approaches remain rather implicit. What does catch the eye, however, is 
the systematic reference to and comparison with antiquity in the mythologies 
themselves. Whereas sociology and semiotics are theoretical strategies for unpacking 
ideologies, the comparison with antiquity appears to be a tactic used to serve the 
critical discourse on mythology. It is not as distinctive as an institutionalized method 
with an elaborate conceptual apparatus, but it does bring forth a specific body of 
knowledge. My proposition is that referencing antiquity also functions as a critical 
and heuristic device in Barthes’s discourse.  
 
This becomes clearer when we have a look at Barthes’s predecessors. In general, little 
research has been done on the phenomenon of references to antiquity with regard to 
modern non-literary works. An important exception is Neville Morley’s Antiquity and 
Modernity (2009)8 which looks into foundational studies in modern economy and 
sociology from authors like Adam Smith, Karl Marx and Max Weber. Morley notices 
that their “accounts of modernity are littered with classical allusions, examples and 
references9”. Morley interprets this continuous referencing as a discursive technique 
which aims to compare the present with the past in order to reach a better 
understanding of the present. In Morley’s interpretation, the historical is the defining 
feature of the comparison: the historical era of antiquity brings out the contrast with 
the current historical era, and vice versa. Morley is convinced that the prominent role 
that is given to the classical past, as opposed to other historical eras, follows from an 
overall familiarity with antiquity. But whereas Morley historicises the classical 
reference, my position here would be that in many cases the historical value of 
antiquity is subordinate to its classical value10. 
 
This holds true, in any case, for the way in which Barthes treats the ancient archive in 
his Mythologies. The historicity of the reference is seldom at stake. There is not a 
single comparison or reference that adds a historical frame to his argument or asks 
for one. The only exception seems to be the mythology “Les Romains au cinéma” [“The 
Romans in films”] in which Barthes criticizes modern movie adaptations of (ancient) 
Roman history. Barthes, as he does so often, starts from the observation of a 
seemingly minor detail: the male film characters all wear their hair in a fringe. 
Barthes interprets this as an indication to the audience that they are watching real 
                                                          
8 See also Gael Grobéty, Guerre de Troie, guerres des cultures et guerres du Golfe. Les usages de l'Iliade    s 
        re   r  e    r     e     e p r   e, Bern, Peter Lang, 2014. 
9 Neville Morley, Antiquity and Modernity, Malden/Oxford/Chichester, Wiley-Blackwell, 2009, p. 146 
10 For a similar case in contemporary Belgian politics, see Maarten De Pourcq, “De Romeinen van Bart 
De Wever. Klassieke referenties in de hedendaagse politieke cultuur”, in Lampas, vol. 48.4, 2015, p. 
411-423.  
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Romans, even though this sign of “Romanness” (Romanité) is imaginary rather than 
historical11. Barthes does not denounce this formal trick as such, yet he points out that 
there is no added value to this formalism since the haircut has no other function 
aside from naturalising itself: this is what a Roman typically looks like, or at least 
what the movie wants us to believe. In Barthes’s view, the detail of the fringe could 
have been functional in two major ways. The first is that the artificiality of the sign 
has an intellectual quality: it could have initiated a more general reflection on 
stereotyping others. Secondly, the fringe represents the difference between a 
historical and a contemporary haircut, and it could have made the audience sense the 
particularity of history – had it left room for other historical haircuts like the 
Ciceronian baldness, which it does not. So neither function can be applied to this 
form: the fringe may refer to a historical particular, but it has been essentialised for 
the wider audience to stimulate a quick consumption of Romanness. It is presentism 
and historicism in a superficial mix but is widely accepted by film audiences and 
critics alike.  
In one of his theatre reviews Barthes makes a similar reproach to an 
adaptation of Aeschylus’s Oresteia, directed by Jean-Louis Barrault. Its mixture of 
ancient and African rituals is criticized by Barthes as a pot-pourri of sign systems12. 
The signs have become dysfunctional, both intellectually and sensually, because 
Barrault did not choose between the ahistorical conceptual and the historical 
particular. These are the two main options which Barthes seems to consider to be 
valid receptions of Antiquity. Yet, as said before, the historical particular plays no 
significant role in his Mythologies. So if referencing classical antiquity brings in its 
                                                          
11 Roland Barthes, Mythologies, Paris, Seuil, 1957, p. 26: “Dans le Jules César de Mankiewicz, tous les 
pers    ges       e fr  ge  e  heve x s r  e fr   . Les   s  ’    fr s e,  ’   res f   f r e,  ’   res h pp e, 
 ’   res h    e,    s  ’    b e  pe g  e, e   es  h  ves  e s    p s     s, b e  q e  ’H s   re romaine en ait 
f  r      b      bre. […] Q ’es - e      q   es       h  à  es fr  ges  bs    es? T    s  p e e    ’ ff  he  e 
la Romanité”. – « In Mankiewicz’s Julius Caesar, all the male characters wear bangs. Some (bangs, not 
characters) are curly, some straight, others tufted, still others pomaded, all are neatly combed, and 
bald men are not allowed, though Roman History has a good number to its credit. […] What can it be 
which is attached to these persistent fringes ? Quite simply, the announcement of Romanity. » (p. 19)   
Unless mentioned otherwise, all translations are taken from Roland Barthes, Mythologies. The 
Complete Edition, in a New Translation by Richard Howard and Annette Lavers, New York, Hill and 
Wang, 2012. 
12 Roland Barthes, “Comment représenter l’antique?” in Écrits sur le théâtre, textes réunis et présentés 
par Jean-Loup Rivière, Paris, Seuil, [1955] 2002, p. 147-155: “L’Orestie de Barrault témoigne une fois de 
plus de la même confusion. Style, desseins, arts, p r  s, es h   q es e  r  s  s se      ge       à  ’ex rê e, e  e  
  p    ’    r v    v s b e e      s  er b e e   e  er    es r  ss  es p r  e  es,    s  ’ rr v  s p s à s v  r 
pourquoi Barrault a monté L’Orestie:  e spe     e  ’es  p s j s  f  ” (p. 147-148).  – « The Oresteia of Barrault 
once more exhibits the same confusion. Style, design, media, choices, aesthetics and reasons are mixed 
to the extreme, and in spite of the considerable amount of work that has been devoted to it and some 
partially succesful results, we do not get to know why Barrault has staged the Oresteia : the 
performance is not justified. » (own translation) 
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own body of knowledge, as I have argued before, what would that body of 
knowledge be and how might it work?  
 
3. Functions of the Classical Reference: Irony, Anchoring and Ethics 
 
In what follows I will focus on two major points: the first is the ironic function of the 
classical reference and the second is its cognitive function. The first may come as a 
surprise, since irony tends to disrespect the classical. An example of this can be 
found in the mythology on the actors’ portraits taken by the Studio Harcourt. Barthes 
tries to capture the picture’s intent which is to idealize the actor rather than portray 
him in his working conditions13. This dehistoricisation of the actor is stressed by a 
Platonic subtext and references to ancient mythology. A great number of the passing 
references to antiquity in Mythologies serve to reinforce the mythical aura of the object 
at stake. It is by adding another myth to the contemporary myth that the mythical is 
ironicly dramatised. The myth, as it were, points to itself. The critical function of 
irony always has its risks, for in its subversion it also tends to reassert the problem 
rather than presenting an alternative. The use of classical myth here suggests even a 
natural continuity of the mythical mindset. It raises the question of whether 
referencing the classical past would not be partaking in its modern mythification. 
One could wonder: is its ironic function critical enough? 
A disclaimer in Barthes’s preface to the Mythologies suggests a certain awareness of 
the fact that his sarcastic style also implicates him in the mythical discourse of his 
own time14. The ironic way in which Barthes embroiders his mythologies with 
classical references shows that it is difficult to escape from the logic of this language 
which turns the historical into the universal. For this is what happens to antiquity if 
its historical particularity is neglected in favour of its classical exemplarity. This issue 
becomes even more vexing when it becomes apparent that in most cases Barthes does 
                                                          
13 Barthes, Mythologies, op. cit., p. 22: “[I]l faut que nous soyons saisis de trouble en découvrant suspendue aux 
escaliers d   h â re,     e    sphy x à  ’e  r e    s       re,  ’   ge   y p e  e  ’      e r q       p       
   pe         s re  g   ,  r p h     , e  re r  ve e f   s   esse  e    e p re  e. L’   e r pre       s  
revanche: obligé par sa fonction sacerdotale à jouer quelquefois la vieillesse et la laideur, en tout cas la 
dépossession de lui-même, on lui fait retrouver un visage idéal, détaché (comme chez le teinturier) des 
impropriétés de la profession.” – « [W]e must be stricken by confusion to discover, posted in the theater 
lobby like a sphinx at the sanctuary entrance, the Olympian image of an actor who has shed the skin 
of the frantic, all-too-human monster and at last recivered his timeless essence. Here the actor takes his 
revenge : obliged by his sacerdotal function to mime on occasion old age, ugliness, in any case the 
dispossession of himself ; he now recovers an ideal visage detached from the improprieties of the 
profession. » (p. 15) 
14 Barthes, Mythologies, op. cit., p. 8: “L  “   ys  f       ”, p  r e p  yer encore un mot qui commence à 
s’ ser,  ’es  p s   e  p r        y p e  e: […] je r     e  e v vre p e  e e          r          e      e ps, 
q   pe   f  re  ’   s r  s e               e    v r   .” – « « Demystification , » to keep using a word that’s 
showing signs of wear, is not an Olympian operation : […] my claim is to live to the full the 
contradiction of my time, which can make sarcasm the condition of truth. » (p. xii) 
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not ironise the classical. For example, he willfully uses concepts from classical 
rhetoric to identify and interpret mythological mechanisms. Also, the classical genres 
of epic and tragedy enable him to articulate what exactly is at stake in modern 
sporting events. In most of these cases, Barthes’s slight depreciation of modern myth 
is even replaced by slight appreciation. For the analogy with ancient literature 
reveals certain intelligible structures and aesthetic qualities by which the modern 
myth does not obfuscate but actually makes us see fundamental aspects of the 
interaction between human beings, as between humans and nature. This is what I 
would call the cognitive function of the classical reference. Yet the content of this 
classical reference has a dubious status, as it seldom possesses a singular historical 
referent. I will try to clarify this with an example.  
 
In one of his most extensive mythologies, “Le Tour de France comme épopée” (“The 
Tour de France as epic”), Barthes draws a detailed comparison between the Tour de 
France and epic, more particularly with the heroism of the Iliad and the personified 
geography of the Odyssey. But since he also ranges features of the modern novel or 
aspects of Christianity under the category of the ancient epic, this is definitely not a 
historicist comparison with antiquity. And perhaps it should not be called a 
comparison either, because its function is much more pervasive: it is a heuristic 
device that supports the articulation of the mythology. In other words, Barthes 
anchors his analysis of modern culture in a classical tradition. The idea of “anchoring” 
here stands for a cognitive practice in which the modern is embedded in or attached 
to what is older, traditional and familiar. The term has been introduced by Amos 
Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, two psychologists who have looked into processes of 
decision-making and problem-solving15. In their experiments, they observed that 
people tend to rely on an initial value or an initial piece of information when they 
have to judge a new situation. For example, people tend to estimate the result of 
“(1x2x3x4x5x6x7x8)” as higher than “(8x7x6x5x4x3x2x1)16”, exactly the same 
multiplication but in descending order. The striking ascending structure of the 
multiplication is the initial information which anchors and here also misguides the 
estimation. This is one example among many that shows how the mind tends to 
deploy mental shortcuts when facing new and complex situations.  
 
In a similar way, the classical world can be seen as an anchoring device or as a 
storehouse of different anchoring devices. It is used within an intellectual discourse 
                                                          
15 Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, “Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases”, in 
Science, vol. 185, 1974, p. 1124-1131. For the use of this concept in the framework of the OIKOS 
research agenda ‘Anchoring Innovation in Antiquity’, see Ineke Sluiter, “Anchoring Innovation”, 
Proceedings of the Vilnius Conference Horizons for the Social Sciences and the Humanities, Vilnius, 23-25 
September 2013, p. 71-ff. 
16 Id., p. 1131.  
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that operates under uncertainty, precisely because it tries to deal with the 
contemporary. It reminds me of an interview with another French theorist, Tzvetan 
Todorov, right after 9/11 in which he was asked why President George W. Bush Jr. 
was so much in need of an external enemy as a foundation for his politics. Todorov 
began his response by saying: “Ever since the ancient Greeks…17”. This is typically 
the sort of mental shortcut which brings in the ancient Greeks as the imaginary 
beginning of Western culture to anchor the impromptu explanation of a 
contemporary problem. My point here is not necessarily that the classical reference is 
misguiding to thought processes, but that its persistence is related to the fact that it is 
valued as a symbolic beginning. It is taken as the official beginning of an unfinished 
cultural process and as such it has become an important stepping stone for cultural 
criticism even until today. This reflexive reliance on the classical tradition can be seen 
as a conservative vein that runs through the work of many French theorists. It also 
shows the hybrid nature of the classical reference: on the one hand, the classical past 
stands for the beginning of a history; on the other, it has permanent relevance. 
Indeed, it brings possibly relevant information to the task of analyzing the present. 
This occurs because the classical past is believed to be essentially related to our 
culture and not only to a singular historical period. This is, in a way, a dehistoricising 
gesture, but it allows an essentialized form of history to cut across the naturalisms of 
modern myth.  
 
Whether or not we assess Barthes’s use of the classical as reactionary depends on our 
estimation of its use in the context of Barthes’s work. Barthes has only a minor 
interest in the social organisation of contemporary culture and in that sense his 
approach differs from that of cultural studies practitioners like Raymond Williams. 
Another point of dissent with the latter is Barthes’s belief that everyday popular 
culture is deeply permeated by the cultural power of the bourgeoisie. It is against this 
perceived power and its unifying effect that Barthes composes his mythologies. It is 
also against this historical background that the classical archive receives its critical 
force. This can be seen in Barthes’s obsession with the contemporary populist Pierre 
Poujade. Barthes stages Poujade in the Mythologies as an Aristophanes mocking 
Socrates – intellectuals like Barthes who combine the clouds of thought with the 
streets of contemporary questions. Barthes takes Poujade’s incessant appeal to 
common sense as emblematic for the closed worldview of the petty bourgeoisie: it is 
only the here and now that counts. Hence, the classical reference also receives an 
ethical function. It brings in a standard and another language which falls outside of 
the merely contemporary. In so doing, the classical reference makes an appeal to 
resist the mental shortcut towards the contemporary. This appeal can perhaps also be 
                                                          
17 This interview took place on 22 April 2007 during a literary festival in Brussels, organized by Passa 
Porta. 
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made to the field of cultural studies, since it is a point generally missed in their 
reception of the Mythologies.  
 
4. Conclusion 
 
When exploring the present, Barthes not only implements modern theories but also 
the established discursive practice of referencing the classical. He does so not only 
reflexively, as the theory of anchoring may suggest, but also ironically and willfully. 
However, the different discursive functions of this practice are not necessarily in 
keeping with each other, since the negative, ironic use of the classical tradition 
conflicts with its positive cognitive and ethical uses. This, in turn, demonstrates 
modernity’s struggle to conceptualize the present and the past concomitantly. For we 
lack the terminology to describe a relationship to the past which avoids a bifurcation 
between historicism and presentism. It looks, however, as if Barthes’s discourse in 
the Mythologies searches out that third position by anchoring its new critical language 
in a classical one. 
